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The Constitution and Political Patronage:
Supreme Court Jurisprudence and the
Balancing of First Amendment Freedoms
Brian L. Porto*
I. Introduction
No discussion of American political history is complete
without a reference to the famous statement by New York Gov-
ernor William Marcy in 1829 that, "[t]o the victor belong the
spoils of the enemy."1 Governor Marcy's statement expressed
the philosophical underpinning of the longtime practice in
American politics of hiring and firing public employees because
of their partisan political affiliations. That practice, known as
political patronage, began in the earliest years of this country's
existence and thrived in the Jacksonian Era during which Gov-
ernor Marcy made his memorable observation. Political pa-
tronage continues to the present day.' However, modern pa-
tronage is less pervasive and influential due to the development
of the modern civil service system, which began with Congress'
passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883.1
More recently, the United States Supreme Court has lim-
ited patronage in three decisions concerning the constitutional-
ity of patronage-based hiring and firing of public employees. In
Elrod v. Burns,4 the Court examined with strict scrutiny the
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1. Susan Lorde Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions: A Government Official's
Guide to Patronage Dismissals 39 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 16 (1989) (citing MARTIN TOLCHIN
AND SUSAN J. TOLCHIN, To THE VICTOR 323 (1971)).
2. Kathleen M. Dugan, Note, An Objective and Practical Test for Adjudicating Pa-
tronage Dismissals, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 277, 280-81 (1987); see also CHARLES H. LEVINE
ET AL., PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CHALLENGES, CHOICES, CONSEQUENCES 220 (1990) [herein-
after LEVINE].
3. See Dugan, supra note 2, at 280 n.22.
4. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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practice of firing public employees because of their partisan po-
litical affiliations.5 The Court concluded that, in order for that
practice to pass constitutional muster, it must further some vital
governmental purpose by means that are least restrictive of First
Amendment freedoms.6 In addition, the Court stated that "[tihe
benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally pro-
tected rights."'7 As a practical matter, this means that patronage
dismissals would henceforth be limited to positions whose occu-
pants could be characterized as "policymakers."'
In Branti v. Finkel,' the Court again examined a patronage
dismissal with strict scrutiny, observing that "unless the govern-
ment can demonstrate 'an overriding interest ... of vital impor-
tance,' requiring that a person's private beliefs conform to those
of the hiring authority, his beliefs cannot be the sole basis for
depriving him of continued public employment."' 10 Nonetheless,
the Branti Court modified the standard it had announced in
Elrod when it held that, in the future, the constitutionality of a
patronage dismissal would depend not upon whether the dis-
missed employee was a "policymaker," but rather, upon whether
"the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the
public office involved.""
Subsequently, in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,2
the High Court faced the larger issue of whether promotions and
transfers, as well as recall and hiring decisions involving low-
level public employees, may be constitutionally based upon the
employee's affiliation with and support for a particular political
party." Again employing strict scrutiny, the Court reasoned that
patronage-based hirings, promotions, transfers and post-layoff
recalls punish public employees for their beliefs and associations
just as much as patronage-based firings do."' Thus, the Court
5. Id. at 363.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 367-68.
8. Id.
9. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
10. Id. at 515-16 (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 518.
12. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
13. Id. at 65.




concluded in Rutan that "promotions, transfers and recalls after
layoffs based on political affiliation or support are an impermis-
sible infringement on the First Amendment rights of public
employees."15
To be sure, the Elrod, Branti and Rutan decisions have
weakened an ancient, if not necessarily venerable, institution of
American politics. Political patronage in America dates back at
least as far as 1797 to the Administration of President John Ad-
ams. Adams' Secretary of the Treasury, a member of the Feder-
alist Party, fired the United States Commissioner of Revenue,
who was a member of the Democratic-Republican (also known
as the Jeffersonian Republican) Party.16 The Secretary cited
"deliberate misconduct in office,"17 but the misconduct consisted
of aiding the political opposition. ' Thomas Jefferson, who suc-
ceeded Adams, refined patronage practices. 19 During the presi-
dency of Andrew Jackson, from 1829 to 1837, patronage dismis-
sals became an accepted feature of American political life;
indeed, President Jackson personally oversaw all patronage
appointments.20
Although Jackson's successors continued the practice, pa-
tronage appointments had several flaws. These flaws contributed
to the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883.1 The flaws in-
cluded the creation of unnecessary jobs in order to dispense re-
wards, the employment of unqualified persons, the temptation
for officials to use their brief, four-year tenure for personal gain,
the need to train a new workforce when the "out-party" de-
feated the incumbent party, and the diminution in the stature of
the president caused by his role as job-broker.22 The Pendleton
15. Id. at 75.
16. Martin, supra note 1, at 14 (citing CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND
THE PATRONAGE 19 (1963) (discussing Oliver Wolcott's dismissal of Tench Coxe)).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Dugan, supra note 2, at 280 n.20.
20. Martin, supra note 1, at 15 (citing MARTIN TOLCHIN AND SUSAN J. TOLCHIN, To
THE VICTOR 323-24 (1971); CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 19
(1963)).
21. LEVINE, supra note 2, at 219 (quoting HERBERT KAUFMAN, The Growth of the
Federal Personnel System, in THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENr SERVICE 30-31 (Wallace Stan-





Act created the independent, bipartisan Civil Service Commis-
sion. The Commission screens federal job candidates by ad-
ministering competitive examinations, protects federal employ-
ees against arbitrary removal, and prevents officials from
requiring employees to make financial contributions to political
parties.23 Although partisan resistance slowed the growth of the
merit system,"' today, nine out of ten federal employees are pro-
tected by one of several merit-based systems used by various
agencies." An incoming president may only fill about 2,500 posts
on a purely partisan basis.2 6
States were slow to implement civil service reform. New
York was the first state to adopt a civil service law, in 1883.27
Massachusetts followed suit in 1884.28 Twenty years would pass
before the next state joined the movement; by 1935, only twenty
states had adopted merit systems.2 9 Today, approximately sixty
percent of state government employees are protected by merit
systems."
Judicial protection of public employees also developed
slowly. Early case law upheld patronage-based hiring and firing,
either on the ground that public employment was a state-
granted privilege that could be withdrawn or conditioned as the
employer saw fit, or on the ground that a patronage recipient
waived any constitutional right that might otherwise exist to
challenge a partisan dismissal.3" In 1952, however, the Supreme
Court held that individuals retain certain constitutional rights
even though employed by government.2 In the succeeding
twenty years, the Court gradually expanded the First Amend-
ment protections to which public employees -are entitled. In
this context, Elrod, Branti and Rutan can be seen as additional
23. LEVINE, supra note 2, at 220.
24. Id. at 221.
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steps in the Supreme Court's steady expansion of the expressive
and associational rights of public employees.
Nevertheless, both political scientists and legal scholars
have criticized the aforementioned decisions, especially Elrod
and Branti.4 Political scientists have charged that, in its zeal to
protect First Amendment rights of individuals and to insure
fairness in politics and public administration, the Supreme
Court has ignored the importance of patronage to the mainte-
nance of strong political parties, and the importance of strong
political parties to the preservation of a democratic political
system.se
Some law review commentaries have shared the political
scientists' view that the Supreme Court's patronage decisions
have been insensitive to the important relationships that exist
between political patronage, strong political paties, and demo-
cratic accountability."0 Other law review commentaries are criti-
cal of the High Court's patronage decisions because they view
the Court's standards for determining which positions should be
subject to patronage-based personnel decisions as vague, confus-
ing, and therefore, of little utility to lower courts and to public
employers." Not surprisingly, these commentators endeavor to
34. See infra notes 35-37.
35. See John Moeller, The Federal Courts' Involvement in the Reform of Political
Parties, 40 W. POLrrICAL QUARTERLY 717-34 (1987); John Moeller, The Supreme Court's
Quest for Fair Politics, 1 CONSTrrUTIONAL COMMENTARY 203-23 (1984); Clifton McCles-
key, Parties at the Bar: Equal Protection, Freedom of Association and the Rights of
Political Organizations, 46 JOURNAL OF POLTms 346-68 (1984); Debra L. Dodson, The
Federal Courts and American Political Parties: Legal Constraints on the Development of
a Responsible Party System (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Po-
litical Science Association, Chicago, April 11-15, 1984); Kenneth J. Meier, Ode to Pa-
tronage: A Critical Analysis of Two Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 41 PuB. ADMIN.
REV. 558-63 (1981).
36. The law review commentary that makes the political science arguments most
comprehensively and effectively is Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political
Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
1567-1645 (1988).
37. See Martin H. Brinkley, Note, Despoiling the Spoils: Rutan v. Republican
Party of Illinois, 69 N.C. L. REv. 719-40 (1991); Steven G. Heinen, Note, Political Pa-
tronage and the First Amendment: Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 14 HARv. J.L.
& PuB. POL'Y 292-303 (1991); Barry N. Johnson, Note, Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois: Another Attempt to Eliminate Political Patronage, 27 WILLAMErrE L. REv. 405-
28 (1991); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Comment, Patronage and the First Amendment: A Struc-
tural Approach, 56 U. CHL. L. REv. 1369-1401 (1989); Martin, supra note 1, at 11-58;




fashion clearer and more workable standards for implementing
the principles announced in Elrod, Branti, and Rutan.3 8
This article will take issue with those cited above on several
grounds. First, it will show that the Supreme Court's patronage
decisions do not weaken political parties in any significant way
because: 1) those decisions preserve the parties' right to promote
their respective policy agendas while in power by means of pa-
tronage appointments of high-level administrators; and 2) pa-
tronage appointments of low-level public employees engender
more public hostility toward, than support for, the parties in to-
day's anti-party milieu.
Second, this article will demonstrate that, when viewed in
conjunction with its decisions concerning state regulation of
party governance and nomination procedures, the Supreme
Court's patronage decisions evince a substantially greater sensi-
tivity to the associational rights of political parties than the
aforementioned commentators acknowledge. Taken together,
these decisions reveal that the Court endorses the concept of po-
litical parties as ideologically meaningful private organizations
possessing associational rights. However, the Court also views
the patronage-based hiring and firing of non-policymaking em-
ployees as unnecessary to the parties' ideological and program-
matic aims.
Finally, by carefully analyzing Supreme Court decisions
concerning party regulation, Supreme Court patronage decisions,
and federal appellate court interpretations of the patronage rul-
ings, this article will identify a clearer and more workable stan-
dard for distinguishing between those public positions that
should be subject to patronage-based appointments and dismis-
sals and those that should not be. This standard will not sound
the death knell for political patronage in the United States, nor
will it further weaken our already hobbled political parties.
Any thoughtful analysis of these matters, though, must be-
gin with a thorough assessment of the Supreme Court's decisions
in Elrod, Branti, and Rutan. Section II will present that assess-
ment. Section III will discuss the dissents filed by Justice Powell
in Elrod and Branti, and the dissent filed by Justice Scalia in
Rutan. The ideas expressed in these dissents are the basis of the




political science and legal critiques of Elrod, Branti, and Rutan
that were alluded to above and that Section IV will discuss in
detail. Section V will discuss the implications of Elrod, Branti,
and Rutan for political parties, public employees, public em-
ployers and courts. Lastly, Section VI concludes that those deci-
sions neither hurt political parties nor advance an unworkable
legal standard for determining which jobs should be patronage
eligible.
II. The Elrod, Branti and Rutan Decisions
A. Elrod
In Elrod v. Burns, 9 the issue to be resolved was whether
four employees of Cook County, Illinois, who alleged that they
had been either discharged or threatened with discharge solely
because of their partisan political affiliations, presented an ac-
tionable claim for the deprivation of First Amendment rights."
Democrat Richard Elrod replaced the incumbent Republican as
Sheriff of Cook County in December of 1970."' The new Sheriff
discharged three of the plaintiffs because they were neither
members of the Democratic Party nor sponsored by a local
Democratic leader.42 The fourth plaintiff was "in imminent dan-
ger of being discharged for the same reasons" at the time that
the case reached the Supreme Court.43
The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state
any claim upon which relief could be granted." The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the
District Court on the grounds that the complaint had indeed
stated a valid legal claim, and remanded the case with instruc-
tions to grant the requested preliminary injunction.' 5 Sheriff
Elrod thereupon petitioned the United States Supreme Court
39. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
40. Id. at 349.









Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality that also included
Justices Marshall and White, quickly disposed of Sheriff Elrod's
initial argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction in this mat-
ter.47 First, the political question doctrine did not deny jurisdic-
tion here because:
it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judici-
ary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the 'political
question.'" That matters related to a State's or even the Federal
Government's, elective process are implicated by this Court's res-
olution of a question is not sufficient to justify our withholding
decision of the question.48
Secondly, the separation of powers principle was not a bar-
rier to Supreme Court jurisdiction because "the separation of
powers principle, like the political question doctrine, has no ap-
plicability to the federal judiciary's relationship to the States.' 49
For that reason, the Court also rejected the Sheriff's argument
that, pursuant to the separation of powers principle, the execu-
tive's constitutional responsibility to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed requires the power of appointment or re-
moval at will, free from judicial oversight.50 Justice Brennan ob-
served that the United States Constitution grants no such power
to state-level executive officials, and that the responsibility for
determining precisely what powers the Constitution does accord
to state executives rests with the Supreme Court."
Justice Brennan then turned his attention to patronage dis-
missals, which he immediately placed under the microscope of
strict judicial scrutiny. 2 He wrote:
The cost of the practice of patronage is the restraint it places on
freedoms of belief and association. In order to maintain their
46. Id.
47. Id. at 351-53.
48. Id. at 351-52 (quoting -Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (citations
omitted)).
49. Id. at 352.
50. Id.
51. Id.




jobs, respondents- were required to pledge their political alle-
giance to the Democratic Party, work for the election of other
candidates of the Democratic Party, contribute a portion of their
wages to the Party, or obtain the sponsorship of a member of the
Party, usually at the price of one of the first three alternatives.5
Justice Brennan added that patronage not only restricts the
freedoms of belief and association, but that it also inhibits the
"free functioning of the electoral process."" That is, patronage
tips the balance of electoral power in favor of the incumbent
party because the public employee who fails to demonstrate sup-
port for that party in one or more of the ways cited above risks
losing public sector employment.56
Justice Brennan also stated that, by so restraining beliefs,
patronage practices clash with several decisions of the Court
which invalidated government actions inhibiting an employee's
political preferences."7 For instance, in Keyishian v. Board of
Regents," the Court invalidated New York statutes that barred
public employment for individuals who were members of "sub-
versive" organizations." Under the First Amendment, political
associations alone could not constitute an adequate ground for
denying a person public employment.60 Similarly, in Perry v.
Sindermann,6 1 the Court invalidated the dismissal of a professor
who had been an outspoken critic of his college's Board of Re-
gents.2 In voiding the dismissal, the Court held that govern-
ment may not deny a benefit to a person in a way that infringes
the person's constitutional rights, especially the First Amend-
ment right to speak and associate freely. s To permit such deni-
als of benefits would be to enable the government to achieve by
53. The original plaintiffs were the petitioners when the case reached the United
States Supreme Court, as Sheriff Elrod had petitioned the High Court after having lost
in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 350 (footnote added).
54. Id. at 355.
55. Id. at 356.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 357.
58. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
59. Id. at 609-10.
60. Id.
61. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
62. Id. at 597-98.




indirect means that which it is prohibited from doing directly. 4
Justice Brennan observed that patronage practices appear
to be prohibited by Keyishian and Perry because such practices
condition public employment, a governmental benefit, upon the
acceptability of one's speech and associations. 6 Nonetheless, pa-
tronage is not absolutely prohibited, but rather, can be justified
by a compelling governmental interest.66 Hastening to add that a
governmental interest is not synonymous with a partisan inter-
est,67 Justice Brennan noted further that a patronage system can
only survive strict scrutiny if it advances some vital governmen-
tal end "by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of belief
and association in achieving that end, and the benefit gained
must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected rights."68
Applying this standard to the circumstances in Elrod, Jus-
tice Brennan rejected the argument that political patronage was
necessary for effective government and efficient public employ-
ees.69 Justice Brennan wrote:
The inefficiency resulting from the wholesale replacement of large
numbers of public employees every time political office changes
hands belies this justification. And the prospect of dismissal after
an election in which the incumbent party has lost is only a disin-
centive to good work. Further, it is not clear that dismissal in or-
der to make room for a patronage appointment will result in re-
placement by a person more qualified to do the job since
appointment often occurs in exchange for the delivery of votes, or
other party service, not job capability.70
Justice Brennan and the plurality acknowledged that pa-
tronage may well give employees of the incumbent party an in-
centive to perform their jobs well and even promote the sort of
political loyalty among public employees that facilitates imple-
mentation of the policies favored by the electorate.71 Yet, they
remained unpersuaded of the importance of patronage to effi-
64. Id.
65. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359-60.
66. Id. at 362.
67. Id. at 363 n.17.
68. Id. at 363.
69. Id. at 364.
70. Id. at 364-65.




cient government, concluding that means less intrusive upon
First Amendment rights than patronage remain available for
achieving efficiency and accountability in the public work
force .7  That is, merit-based hiring and termination for cause
should suffice to insure efficient and effective government with-
out resorting to widespread patronage dismissals." Patronage
dismissals should be limited to "policymaking" positions whose
occupants are responsible for implementing the public policy
program espoused by the party in power.7 '
In reaching this conclusion, the Elrod plurality took the
first steps toward fashioning a standard for distinguishing pa-
tronage-eligible posts from non-patronage-eligible posts in state
bureaucracies. The most important components of that emerging
standard were the nature of the responsibilities associated with
a particular position and the extent to which the employee who
holds that position acts as an advisor or formulates plans for the
implementation of broad goals."5 Justice Brennan noted that,
"the political loyalty 'justification is a matter of proof, or at least
argument, directed at particular kinds of jobs.' ",76
B. Branti
Four years after Elrod, the Supreme Court faced the issue
of whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments protected an
Assistant Public Defender discharged for his political beliefs, de-
spite his having performed the duties of his job satisfactorily.7
The original plaintiffs in this case, who were the respondents
when the matter reached the Supreme Court, were registered
Republicans who lost their jobs as Assistants to the Rockland
County (New York) Public Defender when Branti, a Democrat,
was appointed Public Defender by a now Democrat-dominated
County Legislature. 8
The United States District Court for the Southern District
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 372.
75. Id. at 367-68.
76. Id. at 368 (quoting Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 574
(7th Cir. 1972)).
77. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 507-08 (1980).




of New York granted the plaintiffs' request for a permanent in-
junction, preventing Branti from terminating or attempting to
terminate them on the basis of their political beliefs because
they were not "policymaking employees," according to the
meaning given to that term in Elrod.7 9 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's
decision and Branti petitioned to the Supreme Court for
certiorari.8 0
Justice Stevens, writing for a majority that also included
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, White and
Blackmun, reaffirmed the strict scrutiny standard employed in
Elrod."' The High Court rejected Branti's argument that Elrod
prohibited dismissals resulting from an employee's refusal to
change his political affiliation or contribute to, or work for, the
incumbent party's political candidates, but that it did not pro-
hibit dismissals resulting solely from the employee's failure to
obtain the appropriate partisan sponsorship.82 Justice Stevens
emphasized that the First Amendment, as construed in Elrod,
prohibits the dismissal of employees based solely upon their po-
litical beliefs, and that "there is no requirement that dismissed
employees prove that they, or other employees, have been co-
erced into changing, either actually or ostensibly, their political
allegiance. '83
The Supreme Court's Branti decision modified the Elrod
standard for distinguishing patronage-eligible positions from
non-patronage-eligible positions. In Elrod, Justice Brennan's
79. Id. at 510-11.
80. Id. at 511.
81. Id. at 515-16. Justice Stewart concurred in Elrod, but dissented in Branti. Id. at
520 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 374-75 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). His Elrod concurrence turned on his agreement with the plurality that the
respondents were non-policymaking, non-confidential government employees whom the
Constitution protects against being dismissed or threatened with dismissal merely be-
cause of their political beliefs. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 374-75 (Stewart, J., concurring). The
Elrod respondents were a deputy sheriff, a bailiff-security guard, a process server and an
undesignated office worker. Id. at 350-51. Justice Stewart's Branti dissent, however, con-
cluded that the respondents in that case, Assistant Public Defenders, were confidential
employees with whom the Constitution does not compel the Public Defender to enter
into a close professional association if the latter does not wish to do so. Branti, 445 U.S.
at 520-21 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
82. Branti, 445 U.S. at 516.




plurality opinion had designated "policy making" posts as eligi-
ble for patronage, and Justice Stewart's concurrence had indi-
cated that if the respondents' positions had been "confidential"
ones, then their patronage-based dismissals might have been
constitutionally permissible.8 In Branti, however, Justice Ste-
vens stated that a position can be patronage-eligible even if it is
neither a policymaking nor a confidential position. 5 He noted,
for example, that "if a state's election laws require that precincts
be supervised by two election judges of different parties, a Re-
publican judge could be legitimately discharged solely for chang-
ing his party registration," 86 even though the position of election
judge is neither a policymaking nor a confidential position.8 7
Therefore, Justice Stevens continued, "the ultimate inquiry
is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a par-
ticular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring au-
thority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for the effective performance of the public office in-
volved."88 He also noted, by way of illustration, that although
both a state university football coach and a governor's speech-
writer or legislative liaison formulate policy, it is inconceivable
that being a Democrat or a Republican would make the coach
more successful on the field; however, it was eminently reasona-
ble to suggest that a Republican speechwriter or legislative liai-
son would improve the performance of a Republican governor.8 9
Using this "appropriateness" standard, Justice Stevens and
the Branti majority concluded that assistant public defenders
cannot be discharged solely on the basis of political affiliation
because their only discretionary authority relates to the repre-
sentation of their individual clients.90 That is, they have no au-
thority to give advice regarding, or to formulate plans for, the
implementation of partisan or ideological goals.9 1
Therefore, after Branti, the standard for determining
84. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367-68, 374-75.










whether a particular public position can properly be subject to
patronage dismissals was whether its nature was such that its
duties could not be performed effectively unless the occupant of
the post shared the political party affiliation of those responsible
for filling it. In order to make this determination in individual
cases, one would use the criteria that the Supreme Court used in
Elrod, namely, the extent to which the position at issue involved
advising, broad-based policy formation and the confidential
communications attendant thereto.
C. Rutan
In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois," the issue was the
constitutionality of predicating decisions to hire, promote, trans-
fer and recall public employees on the basis of their partisan af-
filiations, and the degree of support they enjoyed from officials
of the incumbent party.93
The case arose out of the 1980 issuance of an executive or-
der by the Republican Governor of Illinois, proclaiming a freeze
on hiring for every Illinois agency, bureau, board or commission
subject to gubernatorial control, and prohibiting state officials
from filling any vacancy, creating any new position or taking any
similar action without the Governor's express permission.9 4 Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, the governor used the hiring freeze as a
means of restricting state employment and favorable employ-
ment-related decisions (i.e., promotions, recalls, requested trans-
fers) to individuals who were supported by the Republican
Party. 3 Specifically, the plaintiffs charged that when the Gover-
nor's Office reviewed the personnel requests of the agencies
under its control, it considered whether an applicant had voted
in Republican primaries, provided financial or other support to
the Republican Party and its candidates, promised to join and
work for the Republican Party in the future, or acquired the
support of state and local Republican Party officials.96
The United States District Court for the Central District of
92. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
93. Id. at 65-68.
94. Id. at 65.
95. Id.




Illinois dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted."7 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, upon rehearing the
case en banc, affirmed the portion of the District Court's ruling
that had concluded that basing the decision to hire upon politi-
cal affiliation is permissible under the First Amendment." How-
ever, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the remainder
of the District Court's decision, holding that patronage practices
other than dismissal (e.g., transfers, promotions, recalls) violate
the First Amendment only when they are "substantially
equivalent to a discharge;" 99 that is, would lead a reasonable
person to resign.100
The plaintiffs then petitioned to the Supreme Court for a
determination of whether the Elrod/Branti standard regarding
patronage dismissals extends to the promotion, transfer, recall
and/or hiring of public employees.101 Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall, White, Blackmun and Stevens, made it clear
from the outset of his opinion that patronage-based promotions,
transfers and recalls would be subjected to strict scrutiny and
that the Elrod/Branti standard would apply.102 He disposed of
the argument made by the Illinois Republican Party that the
petitioners' First Amendment rights had not been infringed be-
cause the petitioners, unlike public employees who are termi-
nated for partisan reasons, enjoyed no "entitlement" to promo-
tions, requested transfers or post-layoff recalls.10 3 In so doing, he
reiterated the view that he had expressed years earlier in Elrod,
that even though a person has no right to a valuable governmen-
tal benefit, government may not deny the benefit to that person
on grounds that infringe constitutionally protected interests, es-
pecially the freedom of speech.1°4
Justice Brennan also rejected the Illinois Republican
Party's argument that the employment decisions at issue in
97. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 641 F. Supp. 249 (C.D. 111. 1986).
98. Rutan v. Republican Party of IIl., 868 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1989).
99. Id. at 955-56.
100. Id.
101. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 62.
102. Id. at 65.





Rutan did not violate the First Amendment because they were
not punitive, did not adversely affect the terms of employment
and, therefore, did not chill the exercise of the freedom of belief
or association.10 5 In Brennan's view, the employment decisions
at issue in Rutan did indeed adversely affect the terms of em-
ployment, and impose penalties upon certain employees, because
of their political affiliations and beliefs.106 He wrote:
The same First Amendment concerns that underlay our decisions
in Elrod ... and Branti ... are implicated here. Employees who
do not compromise their beliefs stand to lose the considerable in-
crease in pay and job satisfaction attendant to promotions, the
hours and maintenance expenses that are consumed by long daily
commutes, and even their jobs if they are not rehired after a
"temporary" layoff. These are significant penalties and are im-
posed for the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment.107
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Brennan also rejected
the Seventh Circuit's holding that only those employment deci-
sions that are the substantial equivalent of a dismissal violate a
public employee's First Amendment rights.0 8 He observed that
the circuit court's holding failed to recognize that "there are
deprivations less harsh than dismissal that nevertheless press
state employees and applicants to conform their beliefs and as-
sociations to some state-selected orthodoxy."109 Thus, promo-
tions, transfers and recalls of public employees that are based
upon political affiliations, or support, violate the First Amend-
ment rights of these employees.110
Justice Brennan then addressed the constitutionality of pa-
tronage-based hiring, noting once again that government may
not condition public employment upon political beliefs or as-
sociations absent a vital interest in doing so and adding that no
such interest existed in these cases.11 He wrote:
105. Id. at 73.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 74.
108. Id. at 75.
109. Id.
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Patronage hiring places burdens on free speech and association
similar to those imposed by the patronage practices discussed
above. A state job is valuable. Like most employment, it provides
regular paychecks, health insurance, and other benefits. In addi-
tion, there may be openings with the State when business in the
private sector is slow. There are also occupations for which the
government is a major (or the only) source of employment, such
as social workers, elementary school teachers, and prison guards.
Thus, denial of a state job is a serious privation.112
At the same time, unrestricted patronage is not vital to the
achievement of effective government staffed by loyal employees
who are accountable to the public. This is because a govern-
ment's interest in securing loyal employees who will implement
its policies can be adequately served by: 1) dismissing inefficient
low-level employees for cause; and 2) choosing or dismissing
policymaking employees according to the limited patronage
practices permitted by Elrod and Branti.1 3 Accordingly, Justice
Brennan announced that "the rule of Elrod and Branti extends
to promotion, transfer, recall and hiring decisions based on party
affiliation and support. 1 4
III. Dissenting Opinions
The ideas expressed in Justice Powell's Elrod and Branti
dissents and Justice Scalia's Rutan dissent are worthy of a de-
tailed explanation because they underlie the political science
and legal critiques of Elrod, Branti, and Rutan that were al-
luded to in Section I and will be assessed in Section IV.
Moreover, those ideas could soon be the basis of a Supreme
Court decision that reverses one or more of the aforementioned
trio. Justices Brennan and Marshall, members of the majority or
plurality in all three patronage cases, have retired and have been
replaced by Justices Souter and Thomas, respectively, whose
views on patronage are unknown. If either Justice Souter or Jus-
tice Thomas joins the Rutan minority of Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor in a future
patronage case, the Elrod/Branti/Rutan standard is likely to
112. Id. at 77.
113. Id. at 74.





Finally, the ideas of Justices Powell and Scalia are notewor-
thy because, in this commentator's view, they greatly overstate
the nexus between patronage and strong political parties and de-
sirable public administration. The Elrod/Branti/Rutan rule is
substantially clearer and more sensitive to the importance of po-
litical parties in democratic politics than the Powell and Scalia
dissents recognize.
In Elrod, Justice Powell wrote a vigorous dissent in which
he argued that patronage stimulates political activity and
strengthens political parties, thereby contributing to the vitality
of American democracy by insuring the accountability of govern-
mental institutions."11 5 Indeed, patronage is essential to en-
courage citizens to participate in election campaigns for lesser
offices that do not attract media attention or widespread public
interest." 6 Justice Powell wrote that, "[u]nless the candidates
for these offices are able to dispense the traditional patronage
that has accrued to the offices, they also are unlikely to attract
donations of time or money from voluntary groups." ''
Justice Powell added that patronage also helps to preserve
viable local-level political party organizations that, between elec-
tions, perform valuable democratic functions such as registering
new voters and facilitating access to officeholders for citizens
who otherwise might be denied such access." He observed:
It is naive to think that these types of political actives are moti-
vated at these levels by some academic interest in "democracy" or
other public service impulse. For the most part, as every politi-
cian knows, the hope of some reward generates a major portion of
the local political activity supporting parties." 9
Powell acknowledged that the intrusion into First Amend-
ment rights affected by patronage is "not insignificant,"' 20 but
he admonished that the intrusion must be measured relative to
the benefits resulting from patronage and the limited role that
115. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 382 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 384.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 385.
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patronage plays in the American public sector. 12' He concluded
that the pressure imposed by patronage to abandon one's beliefs
and associations in order, to obtain government employment is
insufficient "to assume impermissible proportions in light of the
interests to be served.' 2 2 Thus, Justice Powell did not reject the
use of strict scrutiny in patronage cases, but rather determined
that the state's interests in stimulating political participation,
strengthening political parties and promoting accountable public
administration are sufficiently compelling, and the restrictions
imposed on the public employee's freedom of association are suf-
ficiently mild, to enable patronage-based personnel practices to
survive such scrutiny.12 3
Justice Powell also dissented in Branti, noting once again
that patronage serves the public interest by facilitating the im-
plementation of policies endorsed by the electorate, and that ef-
fective policy implementation is just as important to successful
governance as is thoughtful, creative policymaking. 24 He noted
that:
[t]he Court's decision today thus limits the ability of the voters of
a county to structure their democratic government in the way
that they please. Now those voters must elect both the public de-
fender and his assistants if they are to fill governmental positions
on a partisan basis. Because voters certainly may elect govern-
mental officials on the basis of party ties, it is difficult to perceive
a constitutional reason for prohibiting them from delegating that
same authority to legislators and appointed officials. 2 5
Justice Powell argued further that the Branti Court had an-
nounced a vague and overbroad standard for distinguishing pa-
tronage-eligible posts from those that are not patronage-eligi-
ble. 26 As a result, courts would not only be forced to review
governmental hiring practices that should be left to legislative
and executive discretion, but would have to do so absent clear
guidelines for resolving individual cases. 2 7 He warned that:
121. Id.
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124. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 529 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 533-34.





elected and appointed officials at all levels who now receive guid-
ance from civil service laws, no longer will know when political
affiliation is an appropriate consideration in filling a position.
Legislative bodies will not be certain whether they have the final
authority to make the delicate line-drawing decisions embodied in
the civil service laws. Prudent individuals requested to accept a
public appointment must consider whether their predecessors will
threaten to oust them through legal action.
12
8
In Rutan, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy (in toto) and O'Connor (in part), wrote a
dissent that was every bit as critical of the majority's reasoning
as Justice Powell's dissents in Elrod and Branti had been.
129
Justice Scalia observed that the strict scrutiny standard
that the majority had employed concerning patronage practices
was inappropriate because "when a practice not expressly pro-
hibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement
of a long tradition of open, widespread and unchallenged use
that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no
proper basis for striking it down."130
He also noted that outside the patronage context, the Su-
preme Court had ruled that a governmental employer may re-
strict the free expression of its employees if such restrictions are
necessary to promote effective government. "' Scalia pointed out
that the Court had upheld provisions of the Hatch Act that pro-
hibited political activities by federal employees." 2 Specifically,
128. Id. at 524.
129. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 98 (citing Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980)).
132. Id. (citing United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1949) (which the
Court reaffirmed in United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carri-
ers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973))). The Hatch Act refers to two laws, passed in 1939 and 1940,
that restrict the political activities of public employees. Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-28
(1930) (amended 1974); Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08 (1940) (amended 1974); see Bau-
ers v. Cornett, 865 F.2d 1517, 1520 (8th Cir. 1989). One part covers federal employees. 5
U.S.C. §§ 7321-28 (1939). The second part applies to employees of state and local agen-
cies that receive federal funds. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08 (1940).
In 1974, the Federal Election Campaign Act "amended the Federal Hatch Act as it
applied to state and local employees by removing the prohibition against taking an active
part in political management or campaigns, but left intact the prohibition against being
a candidate for elective office in a partisan election." Bauers, 865 F.2d at 1523 (discuss-
ing Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 93-443 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.




Justice Scalia explained that:
we have held that government employment decisions taken on the
basis of an employee's speech do not "abridg[e] the freedom of
speech," U.S. Const., Amdt. 1, merely because they fail the nar-
row-tailoring and compelling-interest tests applicable to direct
regulation of speech. We have not subjected such decisions to
strict scrutiny, but have accorded "a wide degree of deference to
the employer's judgment" that an employee's speech will interfere
with close working relationships.
1 83
The Scalia dissent concluded that the Court ought to accord
similar deference to the governmental employer when the em-
ployer can demonstrate a logical nexus between patronage and
effective public administration.'" Justice Scalia wrote that
"[s]ince the government may dismiss an employee for political
speech 'reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the ef-
ficiency of the public service,' it follows a fortiori that the gov-
ernment may dismiss an employee for political affiliation if 'rea-
sonably necessary to promote effective government.' "135
Thus, the Court, in Scalia's view, ought to abandon strict
scrutiny in patronage cases and instead adhere to a balancing
standard that endeavors to determine whether the advantages
that accrue to government, as a result of the patronage practice
at issue, can reasonably be deemed to outweigh the restrictions
upon belief and association imposed by that practice. 136 The
Court also ought to recognize, according to Justice Scalia, that
in effect for State and local government employees whose positions are funded in whole
or in part by federal funds." Id. First, those "employees cannot use their official author-
ity or influence [to] interfer[e] with or affect[] the results of an election or nomination
for office." Id. at 1523-24. Second, they cannot "directly or indirectly coerce contribu-
tions from subordinates in support of a political party or candidate." Id. at 1524.
Third, they cannot be "candidates for public elected office in a partisan election." Id.
Federal employees, however, "still must refrain from active political management"
and "active participation" in partisan campaigns, although they are permitted to partici-
pate in nonpartisan campaigns and in campaigns concerning constitutional amendments,
referenda and municipal ordinances. Id. at 1523 (discussing 5 U.S.C. §§ 7324, 7326
(1940)).
133. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 99-100 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Eight v. At, 461 U.S.
138 (1983)).
134. Id. at 100-02.
135. Id. at 100 (quoting United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1949);
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356 n.13 (1980)).




"[ilt is self-evident that eliminating patronage will significantly
undermine party discipline; and that as party discipline wanes,
so will the strength of the two-party system. 13 7
Thus, on the one hand, Justice Scalia echoed Justice Pow-
ell's observation in Branti that the results of the Court's strict
scrutiny analyses in patronage cases were judicial interference in
a policy question appropriately decided by elected officials and
an unclear line of demarcation between permissible and imper-
missible patronage that neither judges, nor lawyers, nor public
administrators could comprehend.13 8 Justice Scalia added that
the line chosen by the Elrod and Branti Courts was not necessa-
rily the wrong one, but rather that there was no readily identifi-
able line between permissible and impermissible patronage that
can be determined by judges and applied nationally.13 9 On the
other hand, Justice Scalia, unlike Justice Powell, rejected strict
scrutiny in patronage cases in favor of a balancing test that
would enable a public employer to dismiss an employee on the
basis of the latter's political affiliation if the employer could
show that such a dismissal was reasonably necessary to promote
effective government. "
The Scalia "reasonable necessity" standard is considerably
more generous to employers than the Powell "compelling inter-
est" standard because it will undoubtedly be substantially easier
for a public employer to demonstrate that patronage-based per-
sonnel practices are reasonably necessary to insure effective gov-
ernment than to demonstrate that such practices are the least
restrictive means available of limiting employees' First Amend-
ment rights in furtherance of a compelling state interest. The
Scalia standard also appears more likely to become the gov-
erning standard in future patronage cases because it commands
four votes in Rutan;1 " hence, it needs only one additional vote
to become the basis for a majority opinion that abandons the
much maligned Elrod/Branti/Rutan standard.
137. Id. at 106.
138. Id. at 111.
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IV. Political Science and Legal Critiques of the Patronage
Decisions
As noted in Section I, political scientists have been critical
of the Supreme Court's patronage decisions for being overly
zealous in protecting First Amendment rights of public employ-
ees, and inattentive to the important relationships that exist be-
tween patronage and strong political parties, and between strong
political parties and the preservation of a democratic political
system. " "
The criticism that political scientists have most often
leveled at the patronage decisions, especially Elrod and Branti,
is that they assign too low a priority to the organizational inter-
ests of political parties14 and too high a priority to the voting
rights of individual citizens. 14 4 This is because the individual
rights emphasis results in a judicial image of political parties as
quasi-public organizations and as "ideologically heterogeneous,
ephemeral coalition[s].
In the view of these critics the Court erred in equating ar-
guably unfair practices, such as patronage dismissals, to viola-
tion of First Amendment rights. 4 6 One political scientist writes
that "[t]o call these actions unconstitutional simply because
they seem unfair is to evidence considerable naivet6 about the
realities of a healthy political democracy.' ' 4 7 This commentator
also argues that the Court erred in Elrod and Branti when it
equated the patronage dismissals of a deputy sheriff and an as-
sistant public defender to the firings of teachers who had ex-
pressed dissident political opinions with which their superiors
disagreed. 4 8 He observes that to draw such a parallel is to ig-
nore the fact that patronage advances democratic politics; "un-
like the firing of teachers with dissident views," he maintains,
"patronage does not threaten the existence of an open
142. See supra note 35.
143. See supra note 35.
144. Dodson, supra note 35, at 52-53.
145. Id.
146. See supra note 35.
147. John Moeller, The Supreme Court's Quest for Fair Politics, 1 CONST. COMMEN-
TARY 203, 216 (1984).





This political party-based criticism of the patronage deci-
sions is reflected in Justice Powell's Elrod and Branti dissents
and in Justice Scalia's Rutan dissent. 150 In Elrod, Justice Powell
wrote that "[tihe pressure to abandon one's beliefs and associa-
tions [that patronage engenders is not insignificant, but it does
not] ... assume impermissible proportions in light of the inter-
ests to be served."'151 In Branti, he added that patronage "serves
the public interest by facilitating the implementation of policies
endorsed by the electorate."' 52 In Rutan, Justice Scalia wrote
that the majority's holding, stating that the coercive features of
patronage outweigh its benefits,'15 "reflects a naive vision of
politics and [exhibits] an inadequate appreciation of the sys-
temic effects of patronage in promoting political stability and fa-
cilitating the social and political integration of previously power-
less groups."'' It thus appears that if a majority of the Court
adopts the Scalia view in a future patronage case, thereby re-
jecting the Elrod/Branti/Rutan rule, there will be considerable
support for the change among political scientists who believe
that the Court failed to give political parties their due in Elrod,
Branti and Rutan.
Political scientists who are scholars of public administration
might also support the change. One such scholar has criticized
the Elrod and Branti decisions because of the majority's or plu-
rality's failure in each case to consider social science evidence
indicating that employees who are committed to the goals of the
organization for which they work are more productive than em-
ployees who lack such a commitment. 55 Patronage employees,
according to this analysis, are likely to be highly productive be-
cause of their ideological commitment to the goals of the govern-
ment office for which they work. 5 6 Moreover, patronage systems
149. Id. at 216-17.
150. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 103 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 529 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 388 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).
151. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 388 (Powell, J., dissenting).
152. Branti, 445 U.S. at 529 (Powell, J., dissenting).
153. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 103 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 103-04.





serve the larger goals of a democratic society because, by linking
job security to the electoral fortunes of a political party, they
stimulate bureaucrats to respond to public demands, thereby
rendering the public administration more accountable to the cit-
izenry than it would need to be in the absence of patronage.157
Like the party-based critique of the patronage decisions,
this public administration-centered critique also winds its way
through the Powell dissent in Branti and the Scalia dissent in
Rutan. 58 Justice Powell's argument in Branti, that patronage
facilitates the implementation of policies endorsed by the electo-
rate, 59 and Justice Scalia's contention in Rutan, that public em-
ployers, not judges, are best positioned to determine whether an
employee's partisan affiliation will interfere with close working
relationships or otherwise prevent effective public administra-
tion,1 60 are closely akin to the arguments cited above.
One law review commentary, published shortly after the
Elrod decision, echoes the political scientist's view that the Su-
preme Court regards individuals as more important than politi-
cal parties to the democratic political process. 6 ' The author ar-
gues that in Elrod, the Court, in effect, created a hierarchy of
First Amendment rights, wherein the parties' freedom of associ-
ation is ranked lower than the individual's freedoms of belief
and expression.162 According to this hierarchy, "if partisan activ-
ity abridges the individual's freedom to believe and affiliate as
he chooses, it must yield since it is a right derived from and
subsidiary to the very freedom it threatens." 6 s No doubt, there
would be support for abandonment of the Elrod/Branti/Rutan
standard among some legal scholars, as well as some political
scientists.
Other law review commentaries, though, are critical of the
High Court's patronage decisions, primarily because they view
157. Id.
158. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 104 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 529 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
159. Branti, 445 U.S. at 529 (Powell, J., dissenting).
160. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Bill Steffes, Note, Elrod v. Burns: Constitutional Job Security for Public Em-
ployees?, 37 LA. L. REv. 990, 990-99 (1977).





the standards announced therein for determining which posi-
tions should be subject to patronage-based personnel decisions
and which should not, to be vague, confusing and, therefore, of
little utility to lower courts and to public employers.'4 Not sur-
prisingly, these commentaries endeavor to fashion clearer and
more workable standards for implementing the principles an-
nounced in Elrod, Branti, and Rutan.6 5 This commentary will
join that endeavor in the following section.
V. The Implications of Elrod, Branti and Rutan
A. Political Science Arguments
As indicated in section IV, political scientists have criticized
the Supreme Court's decisions in Elrod and Branti as having
favored public employees' freedoms of belief and affiliation, to
the detriment of equally important values such as strong politi-
cal parties and accountable public administration. 6 These criti-
ques are effectively summarized by one commentary that con-
cludes that Elrod and Branti reflect naivetd about electoral
politics, distrust of political parties, a misguided anti-establish-
ment feeling, and considerable confusion about the needs as well
as the value of political parties. 67
Such critiques are overstated, if not clearly erroneous, for
several reasons. First, Elrod, Branti and now Rutan limit, but
by no means eliminate, patronage. 68 Moreover, they limit pa-
tronage in a way that not only does not harm political parties,
but may, in fact, assist parties. 169 That is, the aforementioned
decisions permit patronage hiring and firing for those positions
whose occupants make the very policy choices that derive from
party-based ideological agendas. 170 For example, Justice Stevens
recognized in Branti that patronage is inappropriate to the posi-
tions of elected judge or state university football coach because
164. See supra note 37.
165. See supra note 37.
166. See supra note 35.
167. McCleskey, supra note 35, at 367.
168. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990); Branti v. Finkel,
445 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1976).
169. See supra note 168.




the occupants of those posts are not charged with a duty to for-
mulate a public policy agenda that has been broadly endorsed
by the electorate. 7 1 However, he also recognized that patronage
is appropriate to posts like a governor's speechwriter or legisla-
tive liaison because the occupants of such posts are responsible
for devising and implementing an ideologically-based policy
program. 1 2
Furthermore, Elrod, Branti, and Rutan only prohibit per-
sonnel decisions concerning public employees that are based
solely upon partisan considerations. 173 When a public employee
is dismissed on the basis of mixed motivations, the Elrod/
Branti/Rutan standard is replaced by one that requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that protected First Amendment activ-
ity was involved and that that activity was a substantial or moti-
vating factor in the dismissal.17" The employer must then
demonstrate that it would have dismissed the employee even in
the absence of the protected activity. 7 5
Contrary to Justice Scalia's opinion in Rutan, the mere fact
that the Court employs a different standard in pure patronage
cases than it uses in mixed motive cases is not a reason to ques-
tion the wisdom of the Elrod/Branti/Rutan standard. The dif-
ferent standards are entirely appropriate because they apply to
rather different situations. For instance, when a public employee
is dismissed solely because of political affiliation, protected First
Amendment freedoms of belief and association are implicated
and should be vindicated absent a showing that a compelling
state interest justifies the intrusion. On the other hand, when a
public employee is dismissed on the basis of mixed motivations,
including, perhaps, partisan hostility, it becomes necessary to
determine whether partisanship triggered the dismissal or
whether the employee would have been dismissed for cause in
the event of shared partisanship. This determination is abso-
lutely essential to a conclusion as to whether the dismissal was
permissible or impermissible.
171. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.
172. Id.
173. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64; Branti, 445 U.S. at 520; Elrod, 427 U.S. at 349.
174. See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-85
(1977).




Second, Elrod, Branti and Rutan correctly perceive that al-
though politics and administration are closely linked, they are
not identical. 17 6 One political scientist's study of the federal gov-
ernment context is instructive in this regard. 177 Although Elrod,
Branti and Rutan address state public administration, one
would be hard pressed to demonstrate that the generic distinc-
tions between politics and administration that this commentator
identifies do not also apply in the state context. 1 8 He observes
that:
differences of background and style distinguish bureaucrats and
politicians, each set of officials making different contributions to
the formulation of public policy. Appointees' political skills are
needed to identify goals and to mobilize support for them. The
strength of civil servants on the other hand, lies in designing pro-
grams to implement those goals.
179
The same commentator also describes the elements of a bu-
reaucratic disposition as gradualism, indirection, political cau-
tion and a concern for maintaining relationships. 80 He notes
that bureaucrats are concerned about the institutions they man-
age as well as the current policies of those institutions, while po-
litical appointees tend to view public agencies primarily as con-
venient tools with which to achieve their policy objectives.' 8 ' He
concludes that "the different strengths of political appointees
and career bureaucrats must thus be merged in an appropriate
balance if government is to be both responsive and effective.' 82
Former political appointees of both Democratic and Repub-
lican presidents support this view. 8 ' John Gardner, Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) in the Johnson Adminis-
tration observed, regarding career civil servants, that,
[t]here are a lot of potential teammates out there, and you have
176. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 71-76; Branti, 445 U.S. at 518; Elrod, 427 U.S. at 364-65.
177. James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democ-
racy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57, 57-65 (1987).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 60.
180. Id. (citing HUGH HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS (1977)).
181. Id. (citing HUGH HECLO, Executive Budget Making, in FEDERAL BUDGET POLICY






to find them. And the faster you do the better.... I fairly soon
found the people who could keep me out of the bear traps and
could advise me .... I found that immensely helpful, and I think
any newcomer will." 4
Elliot Richardson, who in the course of the Nixon Administra-
tion served alternately as Secretary of Commerce, Defense,
Health, Education & Welfare, and Attorney General, said of
civil servants: "[p]eople who had devoted a lifetime or signifi-
cant part of it to expertise in their field are entitled to be lis-
tened to with respect .... [M]any presidential appointees make
the gross mistake of not sufficiently respecting the people they
are dealing with ...and get themselves into trouble as a re-
sult. ' 185 Similarly, Walter McDonald, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury in the Carter Administration, observed:
I think politicals learn after they're burned a few times that ca-
reerists are really there to serve them. They're not wedded to any
party. And it's very hard for the politicals to understand that...
and it takes four years to convince them of this. How you do this,
[G]od, I don't know. 86
Perhaps the clearest testimony of the value of civil servants
comes from Richard Lyng, Secretary of Agriculture in the Rea-
gan Administration, who stated flatly that, "[a] presidential ap-
pointee who doesn't work with the career people will not make
it. ' 18 7 It would appear then that Elrod, Branti and Rutan, by
restricting patronage to positions whose occupants formulate
policy, foster the merger between pragmatic and programmatic
orientations that both scholars and practitioners of public ad-
ministration support.
Third, the Court in Elrod, Branti and Rutan must have re-
alized that the American public is no longer as attached to polit-
ical parties as it once was, and that in the current anti-party
atmosphere, political patronage, in the words of former Pennsyl-
vania Governor William Scranton, "isn't the great blessing of
political power that some people think it is!"188 Indeed, in the








current atmosphere, political patronage may well destroy more
public support for political party organizations than it builds.'89
The many manifestations of the aforementioned anti-party
ethos are well-known. Nominations for state and local offices are
decided by direct primaries open to nearly all voters, regardless
of their party loyalty, instead of by party activists in caucuses
and conventions.' 9" Even attempts by party leaders to endorse
candidates in primaries are now limited. 191 Where attempted,
such efforts are often self-defeating because they subject the en-
dorsed candidate to charges that the candidate is the choice of
the "bosses."' 92 Presidential nominations are decided in state
primaries that are heavily influenced by national media cover-
age, and national party nominating conventions merely ratify
the verdicts of the primaries. 93
In the presidential contest, the federal treasury, and in con-
gressional and statewide races, private interest groups furnish
campaign funds directly to candidates, while financial support
from parties is minimal.19 4 Split-ticket voting abounds and elec-
tions are staggered so as to reduce the likelihood of party-based
voting trends across national, state and local levels. 195 Many mu-
nicipal officials are elected in nonpartisan contests which pro-
hibit parties from using such posts as vehicles for recruiting lo-
cal officials for higher office. 98
Not surprisingly, in this environment, government workers
are increasingly selected on the basis of civil service examina-
tions, and even high level administrators are recruited from
within the bureaucracy or professional associations, rather than
on the basis of loyal service to a political party.197 Therefore, if
TRANSFORMED 68 (2d ed. 1983) (quoting Governor William Scranton).
189. Id. at 69; see also GERALD N. POMPER, VOTERS, ELECTIONS AND PARTIES 255-56
(1988) [hereinafter POMPER] (examining the decline in public support for political pa-
tronage in recent times).
190. POMPER, supra note 189, at 255.
191. Gerald M. Pomper, The Decline of the Party in American Elections, 92 POL.
SCIENCE Q. 21, 35 (1977) [hereinafter Pomper II].
192. Id.








the parties' ability to use patronage as a tool of personnel man-
agement were enhanced, it is likely that many voters would give
the parties less rather than more support.
Data support this contention.198 Between 1958 and 1980, the
percentage of full-time state government employees whose posi-
tions were filled by a merit-based hiring system rose from 50.7
percent to 75 percent.199 Moreover, during the 1970s and early
1980s, Iowa Governor Robert Ray spearheaded civil service re-
form in his state, Washington Governor Daniel Evans abolished
a category of patronage appointments (appraisers) to fulfill a
campaign pledge, and Utah Governor Calvin Rampton requested
and guided to enactment his state's first merit system.200 Gover-
nor Rampton noted that:
I've asked for the bills. I don't regard it as a weakening of the
governor. Running government, in many respects, is running a
business. And nobody would be naive enough to say that the
skills of running a business or a department of government are
always going to coincide with the person who happens to be ac-
tive in a political campaign.2 1
Governor Rampton added, in response to the suggestion
that patronage promotes loyalty and effectiveness in the state
bureaucracy, that, on balance, the civil service is a benefit to a
governor, while patronage is a burden.2 02 He observed that, "I
think it's much better to have the employee morale that comes
from tenure than to be able to put your own people in."2 03
Former Florida Governor Reuben Askew observed that ap-
pointments to library, drainage and mosquito control districts
absorb a governor's time far in excess of their worth and that
the only appointments that actually assist a governor are those
made at the top levels of executive departments.0 4 Former Ohio
Governor John Gilligan summed up such sentiments in stating
that he would happily have given away a good deal of his pa-
198. SABATO, supra note 188, at 67.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 68.
201. Id.







The above statements reflect an understanding of the cur-
rent American political reality that "[m]ost voters not only have
considerably loosened their party ties, but have come to resent
the blatant partisanship that naturally characterizes pa-
tronage."20 6 Part of that reality is that, contrary to the assump-
tions of Justices Powell and Scalia, individuals continue to par-
ticipate actively in party politics despite the absence of
patronage.2 0
A study of local party activists in Detroit is illustrative.2 0 8
Conducted in 1980, the study revealed that factors other than
patronage account for the survival of local political party organi-
zations.2 0 9 The most significant factors are: 1) the extent to
which activists feel they have "adequate input into the party's
decision-making process at the local level; 21 0 2) the extent to
which the local activists are able to interact with party leaders
who occupy higher level posts, thereby acquiring a greater loy-
alty to the party; and 3) the extent to which the activists possess
political aspirations, which are defined as an interest "in contin-
uing in party work and taking on a more responsible
position. 211
The last factor is the most powerful of the three in account-
ing for variations in the efficiency levels of local party activ-
ists.2 12 Based upon these results, the author concluded that
"clearly the development of organizational conditions which
make the activist feel involved are critical for improving the effi-
ciency level of the parties." '213 Where such conditions exist, local
political party organizations can be vibrant and effective even
where patronage is no longer prominent and the party organiza-
tions are "volunteer structures. 2 14
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fective means of building a political party organization because,
even assuming that the patron can motivate the recipients by
dispensing jobs, once the job is awarded, the patron's options for
adjusting the reward are limited. 15 The patron can reward a
productive jobholder by means of a salary increase or a more
prestigious job, but the size of the public budget or the finite
nature of the services to be delivered may well restrict the pa-
tron's ability to make such adjustments on a significant scale.216
The patron's options for punishing an unproductive jobholder
are even fewer because those options often consist of the rela-
tively extreme step of taking away a job or tolerating a sub-par
performance.21 7
The results of a study of the post-employment political be-
havior of 675 recipients of Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act (CETA) jobs dispensed by the New Haven (Con-
necticut) Democratic political machine in 1974 are, therefore,
not surprising. The study found that the recipients, who previ-
ously had been hard-core unemployed "did not become an army
of willing political workers."2 '8 Although their political partici-
pation increased post-employment, seventy-one percent of that
increase took the form of more frequent voting; "[o]nly a small
increase was reported in canvassing and poll-watching, the
mainstays of machine campaigning. 2 1 9 Thus, one commentator
concluded that, "while a few individuals may have increased
their political activity after hiring, as a group the respondents do
not conform to the traditional image of patronage recipients. '220
Indeed, much of the increase in political activity that did occur
may well be explained by maturation, rather than patronage, for
the job recipients in this study were all young people and "[w]e
would expect some increase in participation, over time, in any
sample of this age group. "221
Under the circumstances discussed above, the Supreme
215. See Michael Johnston, Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study
in the Uses of Patronage, 73 AM. POL. ScL R. 385 (1979).
216. Id. at 395.
217. Id.







Court's decisions in Elrod, Branti and Rutan cannot properly or
fairly be criticized as politically naive or as insensitive to the
organizational needs of political parties. This conclusion is rein-
forced when those decisions are assessed, as they will be in the
following subsection, in conjunction with the Court's decisions
concerning state efforts to regulate nomination procedures and
party self-governance. When the two sets of cases are examined
together, they reveal a fourth reason why the aforementioned
political science critiques of the patronage cases are flawed: the




Law review commentaries have criticized the Supreme
Court's decisions in Elrod, Branti and, to a lesser extent, Rutan,
for announcing a rule that makes it virtually impossible for pub-
lic employers and employees to determine whether political
party affiliation is a permissible prerequisite for a particular po-
sition until a lower federal court has rendered a decision con-
cerning that position or one that is similar. 2 3 One commentator
has observed that "[t]he number of cases brought and won by
former public employees charging that their First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights of association were violated when they
were fired because of their political affiliation confirms that gov-
ernment employers do not understand their responsibilities
under Elrod and Branti.' '22 4
Another commentator has suggested that the reason why
public employers do not understand their responsibilities under
the Court's patronage decisions is that the standard articulated
therein is impossible to apply in a consistent and logical man-
ner. 2 5 This is because the determination of whether a particular
position should be subject to patronage-based employment deci-
sions is an inherently political question that is poorly suited to
222. See infra parts V.B.1.-V.B.4.
223. See supra note 37.
224. Martin, supra note 1, at 22-23.




judicial resolution.226 According to this view, the First Amend-
ment rights of public employees would be more effectively pro-
tected by permitting state legislatures to decide which positions
will be patronage-eligible, subject to a judicial review that will
determine whether the legislative decision is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.22 7
The aforementioned comments thus echo the view ex-
pressed by Justice Scalia in his Rutan dissent that judicial at-
tempts to decide which jobs should be patronage-eligible, and
which jobs should not, are futile because, "there is no bright line
[that separates the two categories of jobs] - or at least no bright
line that can be nationally applied and that is known by
judges. '228
On the contrary, the Elrod/Branti/Rutan standard, as the
following discussion will demonstrate, offers a workable set of
guidelines for determining which public positions are properly
staffed by political appointees and which ones are properly
staffed by permanent employees.2 29 The standard also recognizes
that patronage-based personnel practices require public employ-
ees to surrender fundamental First Amendment rights in favor
of a practice that is neither necessary nor even very helpful to
the building of democratic institutions. For this reason, the
ElrodlBranti/Rutan standard is certainly preferable to those of-
fered by Justices Powell and Scalia in their dissents.
2. The Powell and Scalia Dissents
As noted earlier, Justice Powell would retain strict scrutiny
in patronage cases, but the result of that scrutiny would typi-
cally be preservation of patronage practices on the ground that
they serve the compelling interest of governmental accountabil-
ity at the cost of a minimal intrusion upon First Amendment
values. 230 This standard is misguided because it underestimates
the heavy price the employee must pay for a particular political
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 113 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
229. Those guidelines form the basis for the standard presented in Section IV,
supra notes 142-65 and accompanying text.




affiliation. As Justice Brennan observed in Rutan, a public sec-
tor position is valuable, not only because it provides the security
of regular paychecks, health insurance and associated benefits,
but also because public employment may be the only employ-
ment available to some workers because of an economic down-
turn or because there is no private sector equivalent to their
particular positions.2 s3 When public employment is the only em-
ployment available, a patronage dismissal may cause a lengthy
bout of joblessness and its attendant privations, merely because
of one's political affiliation.
The Powell strict scrutiny standard also greatly exaggerates
the beneficial effects of patronage upon democratic institutions.
As indicated in Section IV, both scholars and practitioners of
politics have discovered that, in today's anti-party atmosphere,
patronage is more likely to weaken political parties than
strengthen them because voters have come to resent the ten-
dency of that practice to subordinate competence to partisan ad-
vantage. 232 Even in a pro-party atmosphere, patronage is not
necessarily an effective party-building device because the re-
wards and punishments available to the patron are often few,
and the receipt of a patronage job does not inevitably spur the
recipient to active political participation.2 3
Finally, the Powell standard ignores the fact that a chal-
lenged practice can only survive strict scrutiny if the means it
uses to limit constitutional rights are the least restrictive means
that are available to the actor seeking to implement it." Even if
patronage arguably strengthens political parties, participation
and, in turn, governmental accountability, it still fails to survive
strict scrutiny because partisan dismissal is hardly the least con-
stitutionally restrictive means of achieving those ends. As Jus-
tice Brennan noted in Elrod, merit-based hiring and termina-
tions for cause are perfectly adequate to insure efficient and
responsive government. 35
231. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 62.
232. See Pfiffner, supra note 177, at 61; SABATO, supra note 188, at 67-69; Pomper
II, supra note 191, at 35.
233. See Johnston, supra note 215, at 390-95.
234. See, e.g., Rutan, 497 U.S. at 68-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 362-63 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).




Justice Scalia would replace the strict scrutiny standard in
patronage cases, although he admits that "the precise test that
replaces it is not so clear." '236 He offers two alternatives, the first
of which is "whether the practice could be 'reasonably deemed'
by the enacting legislature to further a legitimate goal. '2 37 The
second, which he applies in order to critique the majority opin-
ion in Rutan, is whether the advantages that accrue to govern-
ment as a result of patronage practices are outweighed by the
coercive effects of those practices.2 8 Even the latter standard,
which Justice Scalia identifies as the "less permissive"2 of the
two in allowing patronage-based hiring and firing, is misguided
because it is predicated upon flawed assumptions.
One such assumption is that patronage has enjoyed "a long
tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates
back to the beginning of the Republic. '240 Patronage practices
may well be traditional and open in American politics, but they
have hardly been "unchallenged." As noted earlier, between
1958 and 1980, the percentage of full-time state government em-
ployees whose positions were filled by a merit-based hiring sys-
tem increased from 50.7 percent to 75 percent.2 41 This is power-
ful evidence that even in state government, patronage has not
only been challenged, but supplanted, as a means of filling va-
cancies. The same is true of the federal government. Late in the
nineteenth century and early in the twentieth, the civil service
reform movement removed most federal government jobs from
the spoils system by expanding appointment by merit, although
it left the top tier of positions to presidential discretion.2 2
Under these circumstances, it is clearly erroneous to characterize
patronage as an "unchallenged" or even as a "widespread" prac-
tice. It is, arguably, misleading.
Another flawed assumption underlying the Scalia standard
is that because government may dismiss an employee for politi-
cal speech "reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the
236. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 100-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 101-02. See Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947).
238. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 102 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 95.
241. See SABATO, supra note 188, at 67.




efficiency of the public service, '2 3 it may also dismiss an em-
ployee for political affiliation if such a dismissal is "reasonably
necessary to promote effective government."2" Justice Scalia is
in error because an employee who is dismissed for political
speech that interferes with efficient public administration is dis-
missed not on the basis of beliefs alone, but rather because those
beliefs may have adversely affected the employee's job perform-
ance in some way. In such circumstances, beliefs and job per-
formance intersect, and the adverse effect of the former upon
the latter may well justify the "deference to the employer's judg-
ment" that Justice Scalia cites approvingly.2 5
However, Justice Scalia is wrong to apply the same standard
when government dismisses an employee not because of a sub-
par job performance perhaps influenced by partisanship, but be-
cause of the employee's partisan affiliation alone.246 In the latter
instance, because of the gravity of the loss to the employee and
the dubious value of the practice causing that loss, the public
employer should be required to demonstrate more than just a
"rational relationship" between patronage and effective govern-
ment.247 The mistake then, in leaving the patronage question en-
tirely in the hands of legislators, as Justice Scalia suggests, is
severely undervaluing the First Amendment freedoms sacrificed
by the employee and grossly overestimating the benefits to gov-
ernment as a result of patronage-based personnel practices.
These circumstances militate in favor of, not against, active judi-
cial involvement.
A third Scalia assumption, that "eliminating patronage will
significantly undermine party discipline, '248 is also flawed. The
earlier discussion of Justice Powell's two patronage dissents
demonstrates that there is a considerable body of evidence, fur-
nished by scholars and practitioners of American politics, indi-
243. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United Public Workers of
America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947)).
244. Id. at 100 (quoting Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 356 n.13 (1980)).
245. Id. at 100 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983)).
246. Id. at 102.
247. Id. at 78 ("[u]nder sustained precedent, conditioning hiring decisions on politi-
cal belief and association plainly constitutes an unconstitutional condition, unless the
government has a vital interest in doing so.").




cating that the nexus between patronage and strong political
parties,4 9 which Justice Scalia assumes to exist,2 50 does not in
fact exist. Furthermore, even if that nexus existed, it would still
not justify replacing the Elrod/Branti/Rutan standard with the
Scalia standard because the former does not eliminate pa-
tronage, but merely limits it to positions for which it is most
appropriate.
Moreover, to suggest, as both Justice Powell and Justice
Scalia do in their respective dissents, that the Court is insensi-
tive to the value of strong political parties in a democratic soci-
ety, 51 is to ignore the Court's two recent decisions concerning
state regulation of political party nomination and internal gov-
ernance procedures. 2 52 These two decisions are examined below.
3. The Tashjian and Eu Decisions
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut 253 and Eu
v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,2 " the
Court examined state regulation of political parties' nomination
and internal governance procedures. The Court held that free-
dom of association entitles the parties to determine these proce-
dures free from state regulation. 55
Tashjian arose out of a conflict between a rule adopted by
the Connecticut Republican Party that permitted independent
voters to vote in Republican primaries for federal and statewide
offices, and a State statute that required voters in a primary to
be registered members of the party in whose primary they par-
ticipated. " The Republican Party of Connecticut, its federal of-
249. See supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
251. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 104 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,
528-29 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 383 (1976) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
252. See infra notes 253-79 and accompanying text.
253. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
254. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
255. Eu, 489 U.S. at 216; Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 211; see Brian L. Porto, The Consti-
tution and Political Parties: Supreme Court Jurisprudence and its Implications for
Partybuilding, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 433, 440 (1991).
256. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 212. Connecticut statutory law provided in pertinent
part: "No person shall be permitted to vote at a primary of a party unless he is on the




fice holders and State Chair challenged the primary eligibility
law, arguing that it deprived the Party of its First Amendment
right to enter into political association with individuals of its
own choosing.2 5 7 More precisely, the Party contended that open-
ing its primary to independent voters represented an attempt to
broaden its base of support in the electorate, which was essential
to its exercise of the freedom of association. 8
Agreeing with the petitioners, the Supreme Court rejected
each of the arguments presented by Tashjian, Connecticut's Sec-
retary of State.259 The most notable of Tashjian's arguments was
that the challenged statute furthered Connecticut's compelling
interest in protecting the government because closed primaries
promote responsiveness by elected officials and strengthen polit-
ical parties. 260 The majority noted that even if Tashjian were
correct in her assertion, "a State, or a court, may not constitu-
tionally substitute its own judgment for that of the Party."2
The Court went on to elaborate on its reasoning: "[T]he Party's
determination of the boundaries of its own association, and of
the structure which best allows it to pursue its political goals, is
protected by the Constitution."2 2 It further added that, "as is
true of all expressions of First Amendment freedoms, the courts
may not interfere on the ground that they view a particular ex-
pression as unwise or irrational. ' 2683
GEN. STAT. § 9-431 (1985). The Connecticut Republican party's rule stated:
"Any elector enrolled as a member of the Republican Party and any elector not
enrolled as a member of a party shall be eligible to vote in primaries for nomina-
tion of candidates for the offices of United States Senator, United States Repre-
sentative, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of the State, Attorney Gen-
eral, Comptroller and Treasurer."
Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 212 (citations omitted).
257. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 211.
258. Id. at 214.
259. Id. at 222-24.
260. Id. at 222.
261. Id. at 224 (quoting Democratic Party of United States v. Wis. ex rel. La Fol-
lette, 450 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1981)). The Tashjian majority consisted of Justices Marshall,
Brennan, Powell, White and Blackmun. Id. at 209. The dissenters included Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, and O'Connor. Id. at 230, 234. This indicates
that the rule announced in Tashjian, like the Elrod/Branti/Rutan standard, may be
modified or reversed in a future case as a result of the replacement of Justices Brennan
and Marshall by Justices Souter and Thomas, respectively.
262. Id. at 224.




At issue in Eu were several sections of the California Elec-
tions Code, one of which forbade official governing bodies of po-
litical parties from endorsing candidates in primaries, and others
which: 1) dictated the necessary organization and composition of
the State Central Committee; 2) fixed the maximum terms of
office for the Chair of that Committee; 3) required that that post
be held, alternately, by residents of northern and southern Cali-
fornia; 4) specified the time and place of Central Committee
meetings; and 5) limited the dues the parties could impose upon
members.264 The Code further provided that violations of each
provision were punishable by fine and imprisonment. 6 5
The Supreme Court rejected the arguments of Secretary of
State Eu for the endorsement ban and the restrictions on party
self-government. 6 6 The Court held that the endorsement ban vi-
olates the parties' freedom of association because it "directly
hampers the ability of a party to spread its message and hamstr-
ings voters seeking to inform themselves about the candidates
and the campaign issues. ' 267 The Court stated:
Freedom of association means not only that an individual voter
has the right to associate with the political party of her choice,
264. Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 217-19 nn.2-10 (1989).
Section 11702 of the California Election Code contained the endorsements ban. CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 11702 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988). Sections 8660-61 of the Code dictated the
size and composition of the Democratic Party Central Committee, while sections 9160-
9164 specified the size and composition of the Republican counterpart. Id. §§ 8660-61,
9160-64. California Elections Code, sections 8663-72, governed the selection and removal
of Democratic Central Committee members, and sections 9161-70 performed the same
function for Republican Central Committee members. Id. §§ 8663-72, 9161-70. Section
8774 of the Code limited the term of office of a Democratic Central Committee Chair to
two years and prohibited successive terms, while section 9274 applied identical restric-
tions to a Republican Central Committee Chair. Id. §§ 8774, 9274. Code section 8774
contained the residential rotation requirement for the Democratic Chair and section
9274 contained the same requirement for the Republican Chair. Id. §§ 8774, 9274. Sec-
tions 8710-11 of the Code specified the time and place of Democratic Central Committee
meetings, and sections 9210-11 specified the same for Republic Central Committee meet-
ings. Id. §§ 8710 (repealed 1991), 8711, 9210-11 (repealed 1991). Code sections 8775 and
8945 indicated permissible dues for Democrats and section 9275 indicated the same for
Republicans. Id. §§ 8775, 8945 (repealed 1991), 9275 (repealed 1991).
265. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 29102.
266. Eu, 489 U.S. at 229, 233. The Court's decision in Eu was a unanimous 8-0 deci-
sion. Id. at 215. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 233. Chief Justice
Rehnquist did not participate. Id.




but also that a political party has a right to 'identify the people
who constitute the association' and to select a standard bearer
who best represents the party's ideologies and preferences.2 68
In the face of such violations of the parties' freedom of asso-
ciation, Eu failed to convince the Court that a ban on endorse-
ments in primaries promoted governmental stability or pro-
tected voters from fraud and corruption resulting from the
exercise of undue influence by parties upon nominations.26 Eu
was unable to demonstrate that California's political system was
any more stable in 1989 than it had been in 1963, when the ban
was enacted.270 He also failed to show that a ban on party en-
dorsements in primaries serves the admittedly compelling state
interest in preventing electoral fraud and corruption. 1
The Court also rejected Eu's contention that the challenged
restrictions on party self-government served California's compel-
ling interests in governmental stability and voter protection. 2
This is because the challenged restrictions contained in the Cali-
fornia Elections Code do not help to ensure fair and honest elec-
tions.2 73 The Court found that "a State cannot justify regulating
a party's internal affairs without showing that such regulation is
necessary to ensure an election that is orderly and fair. 2 74
Tashjian and Eu reflect a Supreme Court that cannot prop-
erly be characterized as insensitive to the merits of strong politi-
cal parties or as more protective of the First Amendment rights
of individual voters than the First Amendment rights of the par-
ties. Both decisions stand for the proposition that neither state
legislatures nor courts should substitute their judgments for
those of the parties with respect to the manner in which the par-
ties themselves and their nomination procedures are structured,
absent a showing of a real threat to the fairness of the electoral
process.2 75 Political parties, consistent with that proposition, can
268. Id. at 224 (quoting La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122; Ripon Society, Inc. v. National
Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1975)) (citations omitted).
269. Id. at 226-29.
270. Id. at 226.
271. Id. at 228-29.
272. Id. at 229-33.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 233.




influence nomination procedures in their ideological and electo-
ral interests by opening (or closing) primaries and endorsing
candidates.
The political parties' influence on nomination procedures
exists because their freedom of association entitles their mem-
bers to expressive rights that independent voters lack.276 A state
infringes upon those rights when it attempts to control the con-
tent of the beliefs advanced by the party, interferes with a party
so as to deny members the advantages conferred by association
or inhibits the party's efforts to convince others to adopt the
shared beliefs of the party members, absent a compelling state
interest.27 7 Freedom of association means little unless it includes
the power to define membership or affiliation requirements as
encompassing a commitment to shared organizational goals and
to determine whether prospective adherents possess such a com-
mitment.27 Nonetheless, the state retains power to prevent par-
ties from excluding would-be participants as a result of their
race, ethnicity or gender, because those characteristics bear no
necessary nexus to ideology; that is, such exclusions are unre-
lated to the commonality of ideological purpose that underlies
the parties' freedom of association. 79
In light of Tashjian and Eu, the former patronage decisions
can no longer be dismissed as well-intentioned, but misguided,
products of political naivet6. Instead, they genuinely appear to
be the products of two reasonable conclusions. One conclusion is
that protecting public employees from partisan dismissal is a
considerably more compelling state interest than protecting a
voter's right to vote in the primary of a political party, with
which the voter is not registered, or prohibiting official gov-
erning bodies of political parties from endorsing candidates in
primary elections. The other is that political patronage is con-
siderably less important to building strong, vibrant political par-
ties than are the parties' capacities to control their own nomina-
tions and internal governance procedures. Viewed in this light,
(1986).
276. Julia E. Gottman, Note, Primary Elections and the Collective Right of Free-
dom of Association, 94 YALE L.J. 117, 120 (1984).
277. Id. at 123-24.
278. Id. at 126.




the Supreme Court's decisions in Elrod, Branti and Rutan are
more appropriately characterized as the products of political
savvy rather than political naivet6.
4. Working Toward A Viable Standard: The Circuit
Decisions
The import of Elrod, Branti and Rutan is that public em-
ployees cannot be hired, fired, transferred, promoted, not pro-
moted, or subjected to permanent layoffs solely because of their
political affiliations, unless they occupy positions that feature
formulating policy, advising elected or high-level appointed offi-
cials, and being privy to confidential communications.2 80 That is,
patronage-based personnel decisions are appropriate only for
those posts that are so essential to the implementation of a pol-
icy agenda that their occupants need to share the partisan iden-
tity of the hiring authority.28 This standard can be modified,
without losing any of its meaning, to provide that patronage-
based personnel decisions are appropriate only for those posts
that are so essential to the associational freedom of the party in
power that the party's First Amendment rights will be abridged
unless the occupants of such posts share the partisan identity of
the hiring authority.
The modified standard incorporates the lesson of Tashjian
and Eu, namely that members of political parties possess a free-
dom of association that entitles them to control the content of
the beliefs advanced by the party and to confer upon fellow
members the advantages of association, absent a compelling
state interest to the contrary.2 82 The modified standard further
recognizes that a freedom of association grounded in common
ideological goals includes the capacity to implement those ideo-
logical goals in an efficient manner when they are endorsed by
the electorate at the ballot box. It also recognizes that the par-
ties are not entitled to make patronage-based personnel deci-
sions about public posts that are not essential to their associa-
280. See supra notes 39-141 and accompanying text for a full discussion of these
cases.
281. See supra notes 39-114 and accompanying text.
282. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224-25




tional freedom because the occupants of those posts deserve
First Amendment protection for their individual beliefs and par-
tisan affiliations.
Several federal appellate courts have endorsed similar
guidelines, which can readily be folded into the associational
freedom standard discussed above. In Jimenez Fuentes v.
Torres Gaztambide,2 88 the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit announced a two-pronged test to be applied in
patronage cases.284 The initial inquiry is: does the position at is-
sue involve "governmental decision-making on issues where
there is room for political disagreement on goals or their imple-
mentation? Otherwise stated, do party goals or programs affect
the direction, pace, or quality of governance? ' '285 If the answer
to the first inquiry is yes, the second inquiry proceeds to deter-
mine whether the particular position at issue "resembles a poli-
cymaker, a privy to confidential information, a communicator, or
some other office holder whose function is such that party affilia-
tion is an equally appropriate requirement."2 86
In Jimenez Fuentes and other cases, the First Circuit has
applied the first prong of its test in such a way that a position
will be patronage-eligible if it involves services that the electo-
rate considers to be important (such as water, housing or educa-
tion), and if the competing political parties differ in their ap-
proaches to providing these services.2 87 The First Circuit has
applied the second prong in such way as to consider: 1) relative
pay; 2) technical competence; 3) power to control others; 4) au-
thority to speak for policymakers; 5) public perceptions of the
position; 6) influence over programs; 7) contact with elected offi-
cials; 8) responsiveness to partisan politics and political leaders;
and 9) whether the responsibilities of the position are broadly
defined or of broad scope.288
283. 807 F.2d 236 (lst Cir. 1986).
284. Id. at 241-42.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 242.
287. See, e.g., Roman Melendez v. Inclan, 826 F.2d 130 (1st Cir. 1987); Mendez-
Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt, 813 F.2d 1255 (1st Cir. 1987); Collasco Rivera v. Torres
Gaztambide, 812 F.2d 258 (1st Cir. 1987); Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 241-42; see also
Martin, supra note 1, at 25-26.




Using this two-prong test, the Jimenez Fuentes court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs, two Regional Directors of Puerto
Rico's Urban Development and Housing Corporation who
claimed they were transferred from their government posts for
political reasons, had not been denied their rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.28 In the court's view, Re-
gional Directors:
develop, plan, coordinate, revise and monitor the progress of the
agency's programs and thus gauge the success of . . . policies.
Without the Regional Directors' political sympathy and loyal co-
operation, the Executive Director (their superior) might face a
situation where the hostile efforts or foot-dragging actions of any
one of the [eleven Regional Directors] could singlehandedly
thwart the Administration's goals in that particular [region].2
Consequently, the First Circuit determined that the plaintiffs
held positions for which patronage-based transfers were consti-
tutionally permissible.2 9'
In Savage v. Gorski, 92 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that "political affiliation is an appro-
priate requirement [for public employment] when there is a ra-
tional connection between shared ideology and job perform-
ance." 9 The plaintiffs in that case were: 1) a confidential
secretary to the director of a county correctional facility; 2) a
coordinator for a county pre-trial release services program; and
3) an officer of a county veterans' service agency.2 94 In addition,
the plaintiffs were all Republicans who lost their jobs in Janu-
ary, 1988, when the defendant became County Executive of Erie
County, New York.298
The court observed that the secretarial post required confi-
dentiality, discretion regarding the dissemination of information
to the public, and judgment concerning departmental policies
and procedures.2 96 The pre-trial release services position fea-
289. Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 246.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. 850 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1988).
293. Id. at 68.
294. Id. at 65.
295. Id.




tured the making of recommendations to judges "which ... in-
volve policymaking 'at the questionable fringes.' "297 The veter-
ans' service post called for serving as liaison to the public and to
veterans' groups, in addition to managing an office and inter-
viewing veterans to determine their eligibility for benefits.2 9 8 In
sum, the court noted: "There are sufficient indicia here to locate
all three positions at the policymaking end of the Erie County
government spectrum, where the individual employee's political
or social philosophy can make a difference in the implementa-
tion of programs." 99 Consequently, the court concluded that
"the grant of a preliminary injunction [for the plaintiffs] was an
abuse of discretion [by the trial court]. '"300
In Brown v. Trench,80 1 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that the most important factor in the
resolution of patronage cases is whether the position at issue
features "meaningful input into decisionmaking concerning the
nature and scope of a major . .. program. ' 02 In that case, the
plaintiff, a Republican who had prepared and distributed press
releases, contacted media representatives, and promoted county
government projects as Assistant Director of Public Information
for Bucks County, Pennsylvania, was fired in January, 1984, by
the newly elected Democratic majority on the County
Commission.303
The Third Circuit observed that the trial court had "cor-
rectly determined that Brown's position is one which cannot be
performed effectively except by someone who shares the political
beliefs of the Commissioners. ''1 °4 This is because "her principal
duty was to act as spokesman for the Commissioners and help
promote county projects."30 5 Thus, "Brown could . . . be dis-
missed because of her political affiliation without any violation
of her [F]irst [A]mendment rights."30 6




301. 787 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1986).
302. Id. at 169-70.
303. Id. at 168.






In Nekolny v. Painter,"'7 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that a position's patronage-
eligibility depends upon whether that position "authorizes, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, meaningful input into government
decisionmaking on issues where there is room for principled dis-
agreement on goals or their implementation. '"30 8 At issue in
Nekolny was whether the firing of three employees of Lyons
Township, Illinois, because they had campaigned for the incum-
bent Township Supervisor's electoral opponent, had violated
their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.309 The
employees were a driver for a senior citizens' bus service, the
Senior Citizens' Coordinator and a secretary-dispatcher.3 10
The appeals court affirmed the trial court's directed verdicts
in favor of the bus driver and the secretary-dispatcher."' How-
ever, it vacated a directed verdict in favor of the Senior Citizens'
Coordinator and remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of whether that post was a policymaking post. 12
In that connection, the Seventh Circuit noted that the duties of
the Senior Citizens' Coordinator included conducting feasibility
studies and other research concerning the nature and extent of
programs for senior citizens, and that one program that he had
recommended to the previous Township Supervisor had been
abolished when the defendant assumed that post.13
In Tomczak v. City of Chicago,1 the Seventh Circuit refor-
mulated its test to state that an employee's position is unpro-
tected from patronage if "first, there is room for principled disa-
greement in the decisions reached by the employee and his
superiors, and, second, he has meaningful direct or indirect in-
put into the decisionmaking process."815 In that case, the plain-
tiff, First Deputy Commissioner of the City of Chicago's Depart-
ment of Water, claimed that he lost his job because the new
307. 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1981).
308. Id. at 1170.
309. Id. at 1165-66.
310. Id. at 1166.
311. Id. at 1173.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1170.
314. 765 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1985).




Mayor wanted to replace him with someone who was more loyal
to the new Administration.3 " Observing that
the fact that plaintiff's position concerned the provision of water
to all citizens does not mean that the Water Department had no
goals which there could be principled disagreements [about] ...
[the court concluded that the] plaintiff was in a position where
his political affiliation could affect the ability of a new adminis-
tration to implement new policies.3 17
Thus, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment
for the plaintiff and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion. 8'
5. The Proposed Standard
The guidelines articulated in the aforementioned cases can
and should be revised into a single, overarching standard that
reflects the import of Elrod, Branti and Rutan. This standard,
which, in essence, is the Jimenez Fuentes standard modified by
the Brown and Tomczak guidelines, will achieve the goals of
Elrod, Branti and Rutan for three reasons.
First, this standard will insure that the party in power pos-
sesses the human resources necessary to implement the
programmatic agenda that the voters have endorsed. Second, it
will simultaneously ensure that public employees who do not
support the party in power will nevertheless retain their jobs so
long as those jobs are not essential to implementing the gov-
erning party's goals and the employees who hold them perform
competently. Third, it will offer the federal trial and appellate
courts a means of distinguishing between patronage-eligible and
non-patronage-eligible positions that is clearer and more rooted
in the Constitution than either the Elrod "policymaker" stan-
dard or the Branti "appropriateness" standard.
Courts should begin their analyses in patronage cases by en-
deavoring to determine, as the First Circuit did in Jimenez-
Fuentes, whether the position at issue involves decisionmaking
on issues where there is room for disagreement on goals or their
316. Id. at 636.
317. Id. at 641-42.




implementation, based upon ideological or partisan differ-
ences.3 1e This is virtually identical to the initial inquiry recom-
mended by the Seventh Circuit in Tomczak: whether there is
room for principled disagreement in the decisions reached by
the employee and superior.820 The answer should follow an ex-
amination into whether the position at issue concerns services
that the electorate considers to be important and whether the
competing political parties disagree on how best to provide those
services.
If the answer to this question is "no," then the position
should not be subjected to patronage-based personnel decisions.
If the answer is "yes," a second inquiry ought to be undertaken,
as the First Circuit did in Jimenez Fuentes, to determine
whether the position at issue is that of a policymaker or a com-
municator.32 1 Of additional relevance at this point is the Third
Circuit's inquiry in Brown concerning the extent to which the
position features meaningful input into decisionmaking concern-
ing the nature and scope of a major program, 2' and the Seventh
Circuit's query in Tomczak regarding the employee's meaningful
direct or indirect input into the decisionmaking process.
32 3
This second-stage inquiry should consider the factors iden-
tified in Jimenez Fuentes: the salary; technical expertise; power
over others; authority to speak for policymakers; public percep-
tions; influence over programs; contact with elected officials; re-
sponsiveness to partisan politics; and the breadth of responsibil-
ities that are associated with the position at issue.32 " In so doing,
one may likely conclude that non-policymaking positions are not
eligible for patronage, even when their occupants have close and
regular contact with a public official (e.g. a judge's secretary or
law clerk). This is a desirable result because public employees
should not be required to relinquish their positions for their
superiors' comfort or convenience; rather, they should be re-
quired to relinquish only when shared partisanship is essential
319. See Jiminez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d. 236, 241-42 (1st Cir.
1986).
320. See Tomczak, 765 F.2d. at 641.
321. Jiminez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242.
322. Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 169-70 (3d Cir. 1986).
323. Tomczak, 765 F.2d at 641.




to the achievement of programmatic ends. Thus, a patronage po-
sition should feature not merely the rational connection between
shared ideology and job performance required by the Second
Circuit in Savage, s5 but instead, a substantial nexus between
shared ideology and job performance. In this respect, the pro-
posed standard is intentionally more generous to plaintiff em-
ployees and less generous to defendant employers than the stan-
dards employed by the respective circuits in the decisions cited
above.
Similarly, jobs that are confidential, but do not involve poli-
cymaking, such as a personal secretary or assistant, should not
be patronage posts; they require personal loyalty, but not neces-
sarily partisan loyalty, in order for the superior's goals to be
achieved. Such jobs can be performed admirably on the basis of
personal loyalty alone, and a demonstrated lack of personal loy-
alty, whether or not it derives from partisan differences, would
constitute sufficient cause for termination. Thus, the plaintiff
secretary in Savage would not, in all likelihood, be judged an
appropriate candidate for partisan dismissal under the proposed
standard.3 2 6
Admittedly, the associational freedom standard recom-
mended here leaves the judiciary very much a part of the pro-
cess whereby the reach of patronage is determined. This is nec-
essary, however, in a context that requires the balancing of
competing First Amendment interests and the finding of facts in
order to properly balance those respective interests in specific
instances. Moreover, no barrier prevents legislators or executive
branch officials from devising personnel guidelines that carefully
distinguish between patronage and non-patronage posts so as to
reduce the frequency of disputes and litigation.2 7
325. Savage v. Gorski, 850 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 1988).
326. However, even under the proposed standard, the secretary would have to
demonstrate that the defendant was aware of her political affiliation and fired her solely
because of that affiliation, which she failed to do in Savage. Id. at 68. Neither the stan-
dard used in Savage nor the proposed standard will infer that a dismissal is necessarily
politically motivated when a Democrat fires a Republican or vice versa. Id. This is true
especially where, similar to Savage, there is no evidence to indicate that the firing party
even knows the partisan affiliation of the fired party. Id.
327. Moreover, there is evidence that when legislators devise such guidelines, federal
courts treat the guidelines with deference, in the form of a rebuttable presumption of
constitutionality. See Brinkley, supra note 37, at 737-40. In Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d
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VI. Conclusion
Political scientists and legal commentators have mis-
characterized the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Elrod,s" Brantis29 and Rutans "e as detrimental to political par-
ties and unworkable.33 1 In fact, these decisions neither hurt po-
litical parties nor advance an unworkable legal standard.
Elrod, Branti and Rutan do not eliminate political pa-
tronage, but rather, limit it in a way that assists political parties
by confining patronage to positions whose occupants make the
policy choices that flow from party-based ideologies.3 3 2 These
decisions correctly perceive that the American public is no
longer as attached to parties as it once was and that in the cur-
rent atmosphere, patronage may cost political parties more sup-
port than it can gain for them.
Moreover, an examination of the aforementioned cases in
conjunction with Tashjianss" and Eu 3"4 leads to the conclusion
1349 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975), the Fourth Circuit stated:
We find convincing the point that the delineation between the employees who are
and who are not protected from patronage discharge poses an issue which should
be resolved legislatively, not judicially, and that the legislative determination,
when made, should be overturned only if it can be said that it is palpably arbi-
trary or irrational.
Id. at 1356.
Subsequently, in Scott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1990), the Fourth Circuit
stated that, "[w]e believe the fact that each of the plaintiffs in this case held an exempt
position, so designated by the governor, creates a presumption at law that discharge or
demotion was proper." Id. at 142.
In Savage, 850 F.2d 64, the Second Circuit similarly observed, "[bloth the interests
of federalism and the conservation of judicial resources would ordinarily be better served
by the federal courts' giving substantial deference to the state's judgment where govern-
ment positions are so defined." Id. at 69.
Such deference is not inconsistent with the proposed standard for distinguishing
between posts that are patronage-eligible and posts that are not. Indeed, the device that
is most likely to be effective in limiting judicial involvement in public personnel matters
is carefully drawn guidelines that strike a reasonable balance between the respective
First Amendment freedoms of political parties and public employees, in keeping with
Elrod, Branti and Rutan.
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that Elrod, Branti and Rutan are more appropriately character-
ized as politically sagacious than politically naive."' In those de-
cisions, the Court realized the importance of protecting public
employees from partisan dismissals, and the relative unimpor-
tance of patronage to building strong political parties in the
America of the 1990s. 36
A subsequent examination of the above cases together with
several federal appellate decisions that construe Elrod and
Branti leads to the conclusion that the Elrod/Branti/Rutan leg-
acy is not confusion, but instead, a workable legal standard that
effectively balances the respective First Amendment freedoms of
public employees and political parties."'
Ironically, that standard may soon change if the recently re-
constituted Supreme Court hears a patronage case in the near
future. Perhaps the real ambiguity in the Elrod/Branti/Rutan
standard is the prognosis for its survival.
335. See supra notes 253-79 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 253-79 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 280-327 and accompanying text.
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